Enforce and incentivise decarbonisation through contracts
Agree incentives for meeting climate obligations and set consequences for when they’re not met
Agree incentives for meeting climate obligations and set consequences for when they’re not met
Use the price paid for goods or services to incentivise suppliers to comply with obligations to meet climate targets. This is a powerful tool, but may require a high level of internal sign-off, and managing supplier expectations pre-contract, so it could prolong negotiations.
Reward a supplier that meets or beats its contractual climate objectives with a price increase for the goods and services the organisation buys from the supplier.
Agree the contractual climate objectives with the supplier, including emissions-reduction targets. See [Daniel’s Clause] Sustainability Key Performance Indicators in Construction Works Task Orders for an example of objectives. Best-practice objectives on emissions require a reduction of the supplier’s scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions.
Trigger the price increase if the supplier meets or beats its objectives. Require the supplier to integrate the contractual climate objectives and, where relevant, the price mechanism into its own supply chain contracts.
If [Party B] meets the climate objectives in clause [● on climate objectives] during [a calendar year of the contractual term], [Party A] shall pay [Party B] an increase in the price of [●] percent in the next calendar year by [date].
If [Party B] exceeds the climate objectives in clause [● on climate objectives] during [a calendar year of the contractual term] by up to [●] percent, [Party A] shall pay [Party B] an increase in the price of [●] percent in the next calendar year [subject to a cap of ● percent] by [date].
[Party B] shall [use best endeavours to] ensure that clauses [● on price uplift] are added to any and all of its [commercial] contracts that relate to its obligations under this agreement.
Incentivise a supplier to meet or exceed its contractual climate objectives in exchange for a gain-share payment. The payment can be calculated by reference to the value of the goods or services provided under the contract.
If [Party B] reduces [contract-related] scope 1 and 2 [and 3] emissions by more than [●] percent each year when compared to the previous year, as required by clause [● (Agreed Reduction)], the following gain-share mechanism shall apply:
The maximum cumulative value of any Gain-share Payment(s) due to [Party B] in any year of the contract shall be equal to [●] percent of the value of the [goods or services] provided by [Party B] to [Party A] in respect of that same year.
The carbon footprint is measured in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent.
Reduce the price the organisation pays for goods and services if the supplier fails to meet contractual climate obligations.
[Party B] shall reduce the scope 1 and 2 [and 3] emissions related to the performance of this agreement according to the emissions-reduction targets in schedule [●].
1. No variation in price
The price does not change if [Party B]’s [contract-related] scope 1 and 2 [and 3] emissions are:
the emissions-reduction targets in schedule [●].
2. Simple discount
If [Party B]’s [contract-related] scope 1 and 2 [and 3] emissions, as calculated in accordance with schedule [●], are more than the emissions-reduction targets in schedule [●] by [●] percent, the price paid by [Party A] is reduced by [●] percent.
3. Matching discount
If [Party B]’s [contract-related] scope 1 and 2 [and 3] emissions are more than the emissions-reduction targets in schedule [●] by [●] percent, the price reduces by the same percentage amount by which the emissions exceed the emissions-reduction targets [up to a cap of [●] percent].
This price adjustment takes effect on [date] and will last until the end of the agreement unless superseded by this clause.
Give the supplier a rebate on the price of goods or services the organisation buys under a contract if the supplier meets or beats its contractual climate obligations.
[Party B] shall meet the emissions-reduction targets in schedule [●].
The price for [goods or services] will change relative to [Party B]’s performance against the emissions-reduction targets in schedule [●] according to this clause [●].
1. No variation
If [Party B]’s scope 1 and 2 [and 3] emissions are:
the emissions-reduction targets in schedule [●], the price will not change.
2. Simple rebate
If [Party B] has reduced its scope 1 and 2 [and 3] emissions by more than the emissions-reduction targets in schedule [●] by at least [●] percent, the price paid to [Party B] increases by [●] percent.
3. Matching rebate
If [Party B]’s scope 1 and 2 [and 3] emissions are less than the emissions-reduction targets in schedule [●] by at least [●] percent, the price increases by the same percentage amount [up to a cap of [●] percent].
This price adjustment takes effect on [date].
If a supplier fails to meet contractual climate obligations, use a step-in right for the organisation to perform the work, or appoint a third party to perform the work at the supplier’s expense.
Step-in rights are a common feature of services contracts and can include climate-related requirements.
Suppliers will want to avoid triggering a step-in clause because of the cost, disruption and potential loss of competitive advantage. For example, if the third party appointed to take over the work is a competitor. This incentivises the supplier to meet the obligation.
If a supplier fails to meet its climate obligations, use the right to request a full audit of the supplier’s climate performance (or even overall performance) under the contract. If an independent auditor confirms that the supplier failed to achieve its contractual climate obligations, consider making the supplier liable for the cost of the audit.
The management time and financial costs of audits are onerous and a powerful incentive for the supplier to meet climate obligations.
Require the supplier to report breaches of its contractual climate obligations, and propose a remedy for the breach within a fixed period. If the breach cannot be remedied, or is not remedied satisfactorily, the organisation can choose to:
If [Party B] breaches clause [● on climate obligations], [Party B] shall, within [●] business days of becoming aware of the breach, submit a report to [Party A] (a Breach Report).
A Breach Report shall set out all of the following:
The Remedial Plan must explain how [Party B] will further investigate, mitigate and remedy the breach and provide evidence of mitigation and remediation. The Remedial Plan must also include the timescales by which the remediation will be completed. The Remedial Plan must be approved by [Party A]. Approval will not be unreasonably withheld or delayed.
[Party A] may also:
[Party B] shall provide [Party A] with an updated Remedial Plan [every ● time period] calculated by reference to the date of the Breach Report.
Each updated Remedial Plan shall detail [Party B]’s progress in remedying the breach since the most recent Remedial Plan.
Impose liquidated damages if the supplier fails to meet its contracted emissions-reduction target. Calculate the amount as the cost of buying high-quality carbon offsets to make up the difference between the supplier’s target and its actual emissions.
[Party B] shall meet the contract emissions-reduction targets in schedule [●].
If [Party A acting reasonably or an independent auditor] determines that [Party B] has failed to meet [any of] the emissions-reduction targets in schedule [●]:
High-quality Carbon Credits means carbon credits bought from a project:
Alternatively, pay the liquidated damages to a climate adaptation and resilience fund.
Include the right to terminate the contract in favour of a third party that can fulfil the contract with lower associated greenhouse gas emissions. This incentivises suppliers to continuously improve their performance on climate to retain the contract.
[Party A] may serve written notice on [Party B] (the Green Improvement Notice) that it has identified a third party who can provide [the goods or services] with reduced associated greenhouse gas emissions when compared to [Party B] (the Green Improvement).
Within [●] days of being served with the Green Improvement Notice, [Party B] shall notify [Party A] if it can match or exceed the Green Improvement.
If [Party B] can demonstrate to [Party A]’s reasonable satisfaction that it can match or exceed the Green Improvement, the parties shall use all reasonable endeavours acting in good faith to agree the amended terms on which [Party B] shall provide the [goods or services] incorporating the Green Improvement or greater. The amended terms to include the price where relevant.
[Party A] may terminate this agreement by giving [Party B] at least [● months’] notice, if [Party B]:
Include climate-related grounds for terminating the contract alongside standard grounds for termination.
[Party A] may terminate this agreement with immediate effect if [Party B] commits a material or persistent breach of any of the climate obligations in this agreement and, if such breach can be remedied, fails to remedy that breach within [●] days after being notified [in writing] to do so.
[Party A] may terminate this agreement by giving [●] months’ written notice to [Party B] if:
Conditions precedent are most useful where the organisation can exercise non-contractual power over a supplier. For example, the organisation might withhold the award of a call-off contract under a framework, or refuse to grant preferred-supplier status until climate pre-conditions are met.
This approach:
Sometimes organisations have discretion under a framework agreement to award suppliers non-tendered call-off contracts or contracts for mini tenders. If so, use the discretion to award contracts to suppliers who:
Where suppliers hold special status (for example, preferred supplier):
This approach incentivises suppliers to protect their special status by meeting contractually agreed climate goals and obligations.
Provide a route back to special status. If a supplier loses their special status, the organisation should maintain the relationship with the supplier while both parties work collaboratively to help the supplier regain special status.
Jurisdiction: England & Wales
Updated:
Jurisdiction: England & Wales
Updated:
Jurisdiction: England & Wales
Updated: